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Abstract The novel Severe Acute Respiratory Syn-
drome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) outbreak has spread
globally, causing life changing health, economic and so-
cietal consequences worldwide. While COVID-19 has
shown a relatively low mortality rate in young healthy
individuals, with the majority of this group being asymp-
tomatic or having mild symptoms, the severity of the
disease among the elderly as well as in individuals with
underlying health conditions has caused significant mor-
tality rates worldwide. Understanding these differences
in mortality amongst different sectors of society and
modelling this will enable the different levels of risk
and vulnerabilities to be determined to enable strate-
gies to be applied to different groups in society to pro-
tect some groups whilst enabling other groups to return
to normal as soon as possible. Long-established com-
partmental epidemiological models like SIR and SEIR
have been widely employed to study the spread of epi-
demics. However, such models do not account for the
variability encountered in the severity of the SARS-
CoV-2 disease across different population groups. To
overcome this limitation, it is proposed that a modi-
fied SEIR model, namely SEIR-v, through which the
population is separated into two groups regarding their
vulnerability to SARS-CoV-2 is applied. This enables
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the analysis of the spread of the epidemic when differ-
ent contention measures are applied to different groups
in society regarding their vulnerability to the disease.
A Monte Carlo simulation indicates a large number of
deaths could be avoided by slightly decreasing the expo-
sure of vulnerable groups to the disease. From this mod-
elling a number of mechanisms can be proposed to limit
the exposure of vulnerable individuals to the disease in
order to reduce the mortality rate among this group.
One option could be the provision of a wristband to
vulnerable people and those without a smartphone and
contact-tracing app, filling the gap created by systems
relying on smartphone apps only. By combining very
dense contact tracing data from smartphone apps and
wristband signals with information about infection sta-
tus and symptoms, vulnerable people can be protected
and kept safer. Widespread utilisation would extend the
protection further beyond these high risk groups.
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1 Introduction
Coronaviruses (CoV) are a large family of enveloped,
positive-strand RNA viral diseases capable of infecting
a variety of host species, including humans and several
other vertebrates [14]. CoVs predominantly cause gas-
trointestinal and respiratory tract infections, inducing
a wide range of clinical symptotic manifestations [53].
Before the latest strain of coronavirus SARS-CoV-
2 in December 2019, six human CoVs including four
endemic (HCoV-OC43, -229E, -NL63, and -HKU1) and
two epidemic (SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV) viruses had
been identified.
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Despite the recent scientific progress across differ-
ent domains and the increasing levels of public hygiene
worldwide, the combination of various key adverse fac-
tors has translated the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak into a
global epidemic with a real risk to life. The COVID-19
outbreak originated in Wuhan, China, which in addi-
tion to being the largest city in central China, is home
to the largest deep-water port, airport and train station
in that same area [58]. The outbreak coincided with in-
creased levels of travel prior to the Chinese New Year,
that resulted in more than five million people travelling
out from Wuhan in the first few days of the outbreak
before Wuhan was put under lockdown [57]. This facil-
itated the spread of COVID-19 within Mainland China
as well as in countries with high volumes of air traf-
fic with China, such as South Korea, Japan, Thailand
and Singapore [10]. Initial estimates from the World
Health Organisation (WHO) for the basic reproduction
number (R0) of COVID-19 were in the range of 1.4 to
2.5, whereas recent studies suggest this estimated basic
reproduction number could have been higher, with sta-
tistical studies giving R0 values in the range (2.2-3.58)
[29,65,26], mathematical studies from 1.4 to 6.49 [47,
12,54], and stochastic approaches from 2.2 to 2.68 [62,
42]. This implies the reproduction number of COVID-19
may be a lot higher than originally estimated and there-
fore significantly greater than that of MERS (R0 < 1)
[37] and in the range of SARS’ (R0 ≈ 3) [36]. As the
COVID-19 epidemic unfolds, the commonality of mild
and asymptomatic cases has become apparent. This is
a key issue, since unlike with other CoVs like SARS,
where peak viral shedding occurred after patients were
severely ill and therefore easily identifiable, preliminary
evidence suggests that COVID-19 can be transmitted
at the early phases of the disease where no symptoms
are observed [44].
The combination of these factors has led to the
rapid international spread of SARS-CoV-2 and it being
declared a Public Health Emergency of International
Concern on 1 February 2020 and thereafter a pandemic
on the 11 March 2020. The dramatic consequences of
the pandemic have translated into unprecedented non-
pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) internationally, in-
cluding national and international travel restrictions,
quarantine and isolation of large populations, the clo-
sure of universities, schools and social spaces, as well
as a widespread social distancing policy and the ban-
ning of public gatherings and events. Despite these con-
tainment measures by different countries, as of 22 May
2020, over 5 million cases of COVID-19 have been re-
ported worldwide causing death to over 330,000 people
[59].
While COVID-19 has the potential to infect every
individual in the world, the disease has been extremely
dangerous with a greater risk of mortality in groups
older than 70 years of age as well as in people with
underlying health conditions (e.g., high blood pressure;
respiratory problems, etc.). Given the current increas-
ingly aging population in many parts of the world, par-
ticularly, in developed nations such as the UK, where
2018 figures from the Office for National Statistics [15]
reported that 18.3% of people were 65 or over. Put this,
with the number of younger individuals who have un-
derlying health conditions, then there is an approximate
20% of the UK population having a considerably high
risk of death if infected. Motivated by the disparate
mortality rates across different groups in society, this
work proposes a modified compartmental epidemiolog-
ical model (SEIR-v) to study the impact of reducing
the contact rate of vulnerable individuals on the po-
tential to reduce the number of fatalities caused by the
disease. The motivation behind the model was that tra-
ditional epidemiological models like SIR [22] and SEIR
[7] assume equal contact rates and death rates for every
individual in the population (i.e., these models, essen-
tially, abstract from significant individual, behavioral,
and spacial heterogeneity observed in the population
of any country). In contrast, SEIR-v provides a means
of studying the progression of the number of fatalities
when differing contention measures are applied across
different groups of individuals regarding their vulner-
ability to the disease, while also accounting for the
characteristic variability seen in the case fatality rates
across these groups. As outlined in [20], the original
mathematical models the British government used to
inform policy in the UK did not account for vulner-
able people. In contrast, SEIR-v provides the oppor-
tunity to distinguish between vulnerable groups and
low-risk groups, allowing policy recommendations for
each segment, rather than applying a one-size-fits-all
policy. Predictions made with SEIR-v outlined the im-
portance of minimising the chances of vulnerable peo-
ple contracting the disease, with an estimated reduc-
tion of 3681 and 7406 further deaths if their exposure
to the virus was decreased by only 10% and 20% re-
spectively. The widespread policies of physical distanc-
ing restrictions, may now have contributed to another
health problem: loneliness. Those who do not have close
family or friends, and rely on the support of volun-
tary services or social care, may feel vulnerable, accord-
ing to recent correspondence published in The Lancet
[6]. The impact on physical health, arising from mental
health problems due to loneliness should not be under-
estimated and ignored.
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There is therefore a need to help vulnerable peo-
ple exit the lockdown whilst addressing their continued
protection and provide them with the means to partic-
ipate in the contact-tracing process. Here, we consider
practical options for facilitating the exit strategy for
vulnerable groups from lockdown. In line with this, we
provide a set of recommendations:
1. the use of wearable devices (henceforth, wearables)
to enable vulnerable people to take part in contact
tracing,
2. the development of effective incentive mechanisms
in order to motivate people to engage in contact
tracing,
3. the use of digital tools to maintain physical distanc-
ing and monitor health symptoms,
4. the use of personal protective equipment,
5. the planning for easing the contention measures.
The most important determinants of outcome are:
1. reduction of transmission rates post lockdown in the
vulnerable populations;
2. fewer restrictions on the vulnerable post-lockdown
with noticeable improvement in their well-being (many
may already be suffering from loneliness and mental
health problems due to the lockdown);
3. maintenance of keeping vulnerable people and the
hard-to-reach connected and closely monitored.
2 Compartmental Epidemiological Models
Generally, the spread of infectious diseases like COVID-
19 are studied through the use of compartmental epi-
demiological models. Such models provide a simplified
means of describing the transmission of the infectious
disease through the different individuals within a pop-
ulation by dividing the individuals into different states
regarding their current susceptibility to the disease and
their disease transmission capabilities. Within such mod-
els, the SIR [22] and the SEIR [7] models are widely
employed and published in the literature in the field.
A visual representation of the SIR and SEIR models is
depicted in Figure 1.
2.1 SIR Model
The SIR model divides the entire population into three
different compartments, namely susceptible, infectious
and recovered. The transition between one compart-
ment to its following are controlled by the model tran-
sition parameters:
Fig. 1: SIR and SEIR epidemiological models.
1. Infectious rate (β): is the rate of spread of the virus
given by the probability of transmitting the disease
between an infectious individual and a susceptible
individual. This is subject to the disease transmis-
sion probability and the chance of contact.
2. Recovery rate (γ) = 1Tlat is determined by the aver-
age duration of the infectious period of the disease
(Tlat).
3. Re-susceptibility rate (ξ) is the rate at which re-
covered individuals return to the susceptible state
due to loss of immunity (normally ignored due to
long-term immunity).
Given the definition of the above parameters, the
SIR model can be expressed by:
∂S
∂t
= −βIS
N
,
∂I
∂t
=
βIS
N
− γI,
∂R
∂t
= γI
(1)
where S, I and R are the number of susceptible, in-
fected and recovered (or removed) individuals respec-
tively, and N is the total population, which follows N =
S(t) + I(t) +R(t).
Provided the set of equations above, the dynamics of
the infectious disease given by its reproduction number
(R0) is calculated as:
R0 =
β
γ
(2)
2.2 SEIR Model
The SEIR model proposed in [7] is a slight variation of
the SIR model, in that it includes an additional state
‘Exposed’ to the three states used in the SIR model.
The motivation behind this comes from the fact that
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some infectious diseases exhibit a considerable post-
infection incubation period in which an infected person
(exposed) is not yet infectious, thereby affecting signif-
icantly the dynamics of the transmission of the disease.
The SEIR model can be expressed as follows:
∂S
∂t
= −βIS
N
,
∂E
∂t
=
βIS
N
− σE,
∂I
∂t
= σE − γI,
∂R
∂t
= γI
(3)
3 The Role of Non Pharmaceutical
Interventions and Herd Immunity
Non Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs) are those ac-
tions or measures employed with the aim of limiting the
spread of a viral disease when pharmaceutical interven-
tions, such as anti-viral medications and vaccines, are
still not available. A general classification into two main
contention strategies, namely suppression and mitiga-
tion, is made based on whether the measures applied
aim at quickly reducing the reproduction number (the
average number of secondary cases generated per typ-
ical infectious case), R, to values lower than 1, or to
simply slow down the spread of the virus by control-
ling the value of R, while allowing it to take values in
(R ≥ 1).
In other words, suppression strategies aim to turn
the pandemic phase of the disease (R > 1) into the en-
demic phase (R < 1), where each infectious individual,
on average, spreads the virus to less than one person,
thereby causing a decay in the daily number of new
cases. In contrast, mitigation strategies, unless com-
bined with certain levels of population immunity, are
not aimed at the suppression of the virus per se. In-
stead, they are employed to reduce the health impact
of the epidemic by controlling the curve through the
contention of R, so that even though each individual,
on average, spreads the disease to more than one per-
son, such spread is to some extent controlled to meet
the capacity of the respective health care system, while
building up population immunity along the course of
the epidemic phase. Ultimately, such built up immu-
nity will prevent the disease from spreading any fur-
ther, leading thereby to a rapid decline in the number
Fig. 2: Non-pharmaceutical interventions applied by the
UK government.
of new infections and the consequent endemic phase of
the disease.
To date, hybrid strategies through which mitiga-
tion and suppression measures are combined to fight
the spread of the epidemic, are being adopted by the
vast majority of countries severely affected by COVID-
19. Such strategies have overall included the imple-
mentation of diverse contention measures including the
instruction to self-isolate to confirmed and suspected
cases, the encouragement of social distancing, the ban-
ning of non essential travel, mass gatherings and pub-
lic events, the closure of schools and universities and
the lockdown of the population. Whilst allowing key
workers to carry out their duties and then broadly the
general public in lockdown at home were allowed to go
out for essentials like food and exercise. The analysis of
existing data has already demonstrated that mass test-
ing and the isolation of infected individuals can on its
own have a suppressive impact on the curve, thereby
reducing significantly the size of the peak [2]. Exam-
ples include the strategies followed by South Korea and
Germany. However, it must be noted that the adop-
tion of suppression strategies is challenging due to the
low level of herd immunity achieved as function of time
throughout the progression of the disease, thereby, to
avoid the eventual increase of new infections, the con-
tention measures have to be maintained until pharma-
ceutical interventions are available.
Although still no empirical evidence can be found
suggesting the dismissal of the possibility of reinfec-
tion from COVID-19, the results reported on studies
investigating the persistence of antibodies in patients
exposed to similar CoVs [32,63,3,41] suggest the anti-
body immunity built up by individuals exposed to the
SARS-CoV-2 virus may potentially last until medical
interventions are available. For instance, the study in
[32] showed the persistence of antibodies in patients
infected by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coro-
navirus (SARS-CoV), could last for at least two years.
The results reported in [63], where 176 patients were
found to maintain SARS-specific antibodies for 2 years
were in line with those of [32]. A significant reduction
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Fig. 3: SEIR-v epidemiological model.
of immunoglobulin Gpositive was the case in the third
year. Thus, SARS patients might be susceptible to re-
infection 3 years after the initial exposure to the virus.
Regarding the immunity against MERS-CoV, the work
in [3] studied the antibody response in 9 healthcare
workers in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, who had previously
suffered from the disease showing symptoms of severe
pneumonia. A further study in [41], explored the long-
term antibody response against MERS-CoV. This re-
search reported the persistence of antibodies, including
neutralising antibodies, in 6 out of the 7 (86%) explored
individuals for at least 34 months after the outbreak.
4 Proposed Model: SEIR-v
The need to develop the SEIR-v model comes from the
consideration of the characteristic variability encoun-
tered in the severity of COVID-19 across different in-
dividuals with respect to their age group and state of
health during the early phase of the infection. Evidence
suggests, the mortality rate in individuals of advanced
age and / or with underlying health conditions is signif-
icantly higher than that in younger healthier individ-
uals [19]. Thereby, to reduce the number of fatalities,
it is crucial to have detailed means of looking more
closely into the impact of the application of the different
NPIs across the different population groups regarding
their vulnerability to the disease on the overall mor-
tality rate. SEIR-v provides a means of studying the
impact of the different NPIs on the number of deaths,
when these are only applied to people with higher vul-
nerability to the disease. The SEIR-v compartmental
model can be defined as follows:
∂S
∂t
= −(1− pv)βIS
N
− pv βvIS
N
,
∂E
∂t
= (1− pv)βIS
N
− σE
∂Ev
∂t
= pv
βvIS
N
− σEv,
∂I
∂t
= σE − γI,
∂Iv
∂t
= σEv − γIv,
∂R
∂t
= γI(1− µ),
∂Rv
∂t
= γI(1− µv),
∂D
∂t
= γIµ+ γIvµv
(4)
where S is the number of susceptible individuals. E, I,
R are the number of non vulnerable exposed, infectious
and recovered individuals respectively. Ev Iv, Rv are
the number of vulnerable exposed, infectious and re-
covered individuals respectively. D is the total number
of deaths caused by the disease. pv is the probability
of an individual being vulnerable to the disease. β and
6 Dario Ortega Anderez*1 et al.
βv are the contact rates by non vulnerable and by vul-
nerable individuals respectively. σ is the rate at which
an exposed individual becomes infectious. γ is the the
rate at which an infectious individual recovers from the
disease. µ and µv are the case fatality rates for non vul-
nerable and for vulnerable individuals respectively. The
conceptual diagram of SEIR-v can be seen in Figure 3.
4.1 Model Parameterisation
Definitive values for the different parameters that de-
fine the spread of the COVID-19 and the impact of the
contention measures in place are still unknown, given
that the disease is still spreading globally and key in-
formation is still unknown. For instance, the number of
asymptomatic cases and consequently the total number
of individuals who are or have been infected by the dis-
ease remains to be determined. Consequently, the mor-
tality ratio of the disease is also unknown. Motivated by
this fact, first efforts were aimed at estimating the value
of the different model parameters through the compar-
ison of the estimated number of deaths and the real
number of deaths as reported in [60].To do so, the in-
cubation period and recovery rate estimated in previous
work were taken into consideration [28]. With these fig-
ures, the best fit parameters were identified by running
a Monte Carlo simulation with 100.000 runs, allowing
the rest of the parameters to take random values from a
Gaussian distribution within their respective expected
intervals. The definitions of the different model param-
eters can be found in Table 1.
4.1.1 Virus Transmissibility Study
Given the parameters provided in Table 1, the final
mortality rate of COVID-19 was studied as a function
of the percentage decrease in the contact rate of vul-
nerable individuals (βv). The estimated 95% confidence
interval (95% CI) and the reduction in the number of
deaths caused by the disease estimated by the best fit
model are provided.
5 Results
The results achieved by the analysis of the number of
deaths caused by COVID-19 as a function of the contact
rate of vulnerable individuals (βv) are presented in this
section. Two different scenarios were considered:
1. The vulnerable group contact rate, βv, is decreased
from the beginning of the outbreak. With this sce-
nario, the potential reduction in the number of deaths
Fig. 4: Reduction in the number of deaths as a function
of the percentage decrease in βv, given that this reduc-
tion is applied at the beginning of the outbreak. The
shaded area correspond to the Monte Carlo Simulation
95% CI.
if more protective measures for vulnerable groups
had been applied from the beginning of the outbreak
was studied.
2. The vulnerable group contact rate, βv, is decreased
from now. With this, the potential reduction in the
number of deaths the disease will cause from today
was studied.
5.1 Reduction of the Contact Rate of Vulnerable
Individuals from the Beginning of the Outbreak
The potential reduction in the number of deaths caused
by COVID-19 as a function of the percentage decrease
applied to βv achieved by the Monte Carlo simulation
is shown in Figure 4. From this data, the reduction of
the exposure of vulnerable groups to the disease at the
beginning of the outbreak greatly decreases the number
of deaths, The mean figures for the prevented deaths for
each 10% decrease in βv are shown in Table 2.
Similarly, the results obtained by the use of the best
fit model across the Monte Carlo simulation are shown
in Figure 5. The performance of this model at predicting
the number of deaths caused by COVID-19 can be seen
in Figure 6. The prediction given by the best fit model
for the total number of deaths caused by COVID-19 in
the UK at the end of the outbreak is 37329.
5.1.1 Reduction of the Contact Rate of Vulnerable
Individuals at Present
While this data from modelling reported the decrease
in the number of deaths if the exposure of vulnerable
people to the virus had been reduced from the begin-
ning of the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak, this section presents
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Table 1: Description of the SEIR-v model parameters
Parameter Description Value Comments
N Population 67.838.235 [61] Total population in the UK as of 2020
Ev0 Vulnerable Exposed 2 Vulnerable individuals exposed to the disease at the beginning of the outbreak
E0 Exposed 4 Non-vulnerable individuals exposed to the disease at the beginning of the outbreak
Iv0 Infected 0 Vulnerable infected individuals at the beginning of the outbreak
I0 Infected 1 Non-vulnerable infected individuals at the beginning of the outbreak
Tinc Incubation period 5.6 [28] σ =
1
Tinc
The time it takes for an exposed individual to become infectious
Tlat Latent period 7.5 [28] γ =
1
Tlat
The time it takes for an infectious individual to recover
µv
Vulnerable
Case Fatality Rate
[0.004-0.036, 95% CI]% Case fatality rate of COVID-19 on vulnerable individuals
µ
Non-vulnerable
Case Fatality Rate
[0.000003-0.000007, 95% CI]% Case fatality rate of COVID-19 on non-vulnerable individuals
pv Vulnerable probability 0.2 Probability of an individual being vulnerable to the disease
η Fear Factor 0.33
Fear factor caused by the recommendation made by the UK government for
vulnerable individuals to stay at home for at least 12 weeks at the beginning
of the outbreak and the widespread severity of the disease within this group
β0 Initial Contact Rate [0.5-2.1, 95% CI] Contact rate at the beginning of the outbreak
β1 Contact Rate 1 [0.9-0.95, 95% CI]*β0 Contact rate after the mandate of case-based self isolation
β2 Contact Rate 2 [0.9-0.95, 95% CI]*β1 Contact rate after government encouragement for social distancing
β3 Contact Rate 3 [0.75-0.85, 95% CI]*β2 Contact rate after schools closure
β4 Contact Rate 4 [0.40-0.60, 95% CI]*β3 Contact rate after lockdown order and banning of public events
β5 Contact Rate 5 [1.1-1.9, 95% CI]*β4 Contact rate after recommendation for people to go back to work
βvi Vulnerable Contact Rate η ∗ βi Contact rate of vulnerable individuals.
Table 2: Relationship between the decrease in βv and the resultant number of deaths avoided when this decrease
is applied from the beginning of the outbreak expressed as the mean value of the Monte Carlo simulation
Decrease in βv 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
Decrease in number of deaths 7699 15512 23428 31434 39519 47671 55876 64122 72395
the benefits this reduction would bring if actions were
taken from this point in time going forwards.
The potential reduction in the number of deaths
caused by COVID-19 as a function of the percentage
decrease applied to βv achieved by the Monte Carlo
simulation is shown in Figure 7. As it can be seen in
the figure, the reduction of the exposure of vulnerable
groups to the disease at the beginning of the outbreak
greatly decreases the number of deaths, The mean fig-
ures for the prevented deaths for each 10% decrease in
βv are shown in Table 3.
The results obtained by the use of the best fit model
are shown in Figure 5.
6 Discussion and Recommendations for the
Way Back to ”Normality”
From the results of the modelling, it has been evidenced
it is crucial to consider the contrasting vulnerability
in different groups of the population regarding their
age and overall health condition when developing plans
to return to normality. Motivated by this, three main
points for consideration are proposed, namely 1) the use
of dedicated wristbands for the vulnerable to enable
social distancing and protect their well-being, 2) the
use of Personal Protective Equipment(PPE) and 3) the
lockdown easing plan and the benefits they can bring.
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Table 3: Relationship between the decrease in βv and the resultant number of deaths avoided when this decrease
is applied from today (21 May 2020) expressed as the mean value of the Monte Carlo simulation.
Decrease in βv 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
Decrease in number of deaths 3681 7406 11172 14975 18810 22673 26559 30464 34383
Fig. 5: Reduction in the number of deaths as a function
of the percentage decrease in βv for the best fit model,
given that this reduction is applied at the beginning of
the outbreak.
Fig. 6: Predicted number of deaths using the best fit
model vs the number of deaths reported (real).
6.1 Protecting the Vulnerable People
Contact tracing, which has been used alongside other
protection measures across the world, can keep a record
of any new infection cases and anyone who has been
close to them [56]. This could enable uninfected and
immune people to leave their homes, while people who
might have been infected instructed to self-isolate. How-
ever, contract tracing is time consuming and resource
intensive and to be strictly accurate and valid requires
100Bluetooth technology has been used previously for
messaging and tracking of nearby devices using prox-
imity detection [21] [17]. Apple and Google along with
Fig. 7: Reduction in the number of deaths as a function
of the percentage decrease in βv, given that this reduc-
tion is applied at present. The shaded area represents
the Monte Carlo Simulation 95% CI.
Fig. 8: Reduction in the number of deaths as a function
of the percentage decrease in βv for the best fit model,
given that this reduction is applied from 21 May 2020.
many health authorities have proposed software smart-
phone hosted apps using Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
to automate the contact tracing process [5]. BLE is
a form of wireless communication designed especially
for short-range communication suitable for situations
where battery life is preferred over high data trans-
fer speeds. Unfortunately, vulnerable and older peo-
ple are more likely to use older smartphones that dont
come equipped with the BLE feature, e.g. about 9-12%
of smartphones in the UK lack the BLE functionality
needed for it to work. In addition, data from Ofcom
shows that while around 80 per cent of all adults owned
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a smart mobile phone in 2018, only 47% of 65-74 year
old’s, and 26% of over 75s did [35]. This is supported
by data published by Statista, which indicates that only
40% of over 65s used a smart phone to connect to the
internet in 2019 [52]. Furthermore, many people have
privacy concerns about using their smart phones as a
tracer and they might not be willing to download a
contact tracing app. With this background, three possi-
ble solutions to support vulnerable people are proposed
1) contact Tracing wristband or wearable,2) social dis-
tancing alert mechanism and, 3) a wearable to monitor
symptoms.
6.1.1 Wearables for Contact Tracing
The effectiveness of contact tracing hinges on how many
people use it. It is proposed that governments could
provide vulnerable individuals with a BLE wristband
similar to the one in Figure 9), closing a data collection
hole created by systems relying on smartphones and an
app only. Aiming to take a population to 100
The wristband includes a proximity sensor powered
by BLE. It also includes a manual control to self-report
and change a wearers status, recording states like self-
isolating, symptomatic and, tested negative or tested
infected. When a user updates their state to indicate
an infection after testing, that updates others they have
been in close proximity with.
Fig. 9: Wristband for Vulnerable People
Figure 10 shows how the wristband concept works.
Contacts of an individual wearing the wristband A are
recorded on the wristband. A passer-by (e.g. postman)
with a smartphone and Contact Tracing app comes
within read range (longer range than close proximity)
and downloads the records broadcasted by the wrist-
band A. In turns. The individual wearing the wrist-
band A could be alerted in real time using LED light
(or sound) of close proximity events. We believe that
adopting wearable (e.g. wristbands) solutions is advan-
tageous over mobile apps for the following reasons:
Fig. 10: A schematic of wearable-based COVID-19
proximity tracing
1. Mobile phones might not be always with users. In-
stead, they might be left at home, in the car or at
work, which means their social encounters don’t al-
ways correspond to actual contact.
2. A wristband solution will only have radio technology
with a small memory and a battery with no access
to users data which could help to preserve privacy,
as it is low power it can always be on. It does not
require setting up or installation by the wearer.
3. Phone apps require to be installed and activated by
the users, Bluetooth need to be switched on. These
requirements make the apps unfeasible for vulnera-
ble people with difficulties in remembering instruc-
tions; and lack of digital literacy, vision or motor
control.
4. Contact Tracing app can consume more energy as
they are often kept active with battery optimisation
features disabled.
5. Wearables are more likely to be work in front of
the body (e.g. wristbands, necklace or a keyfob),
which could potentially improve the accuracy of the
proximity detection in the case of the face of face
contact.
6. Smart phones come with different operating systems
and settings, which means each model might require
individual calibration and configuration.
6.1.2 Digital tools to maintain Social distancing
By combining very dense contact tracing data from
smartphone apps and wristbands signals with informa-
tion about infection status and symptoms, vulnerable
people can be protected and kept safe. Many countries
have introduced wristbands for different purposes. For
instance, in South Korea, people found to be violat-
ing lockdown rules can be ordered to wear a tracking
band, which alerts the police if people leave the house
[1]. The trackers were introduced after people started
to leave their phones at home to avoid detection. The
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Fig. 11: A BLE mobile app and a keyfob concept devel-
oped at Nottingham Trent University (NTU) to alert
people when they are within 2m proximity.
devices also alert the authorities if people try to remove
it. Bulgaria has been testing Comarch LifeWristbands,
developed in Poland [1]. This system in addition to con-
firming a person is staying at home, can monitor the
wearer’s heart rate and then be used to call the emer-
gency services.
Contact Tracing apps and Internet of Things (IOT)
such as key fobs, tags or wrist bands can also be used
to alert people (e.g. using vibration) if another device
comes within a specified distance. Figure 11 shows BLE
keyfob and KeepyourDistance app concepts being de-
veloped at Nottingham Trent University (NTU) to main-
tain social distancing. The KeepyourDistance screen-
shots show the signal strengths of nearby devices and
it vibrates when other phones with the same app are in
close proximity.
6.1.3 Wearable to monitor symptoms
Dedicated health wristbands can be provided to vul-
nerable people with underling health conditions to track
their health including: temperature, breathing and heart
rate, and transmit it to their doctors. In addition to
the above functionalities, most commercially available
smart-wristbands and smart-watches incorporate an in-
ertial measurement unit (IMU) composed of tri-axial
accelerometers and gyroscopes. The work in [23] re-
ports a face touching frequency of 23 times per hour
with 44% of the face touches involving contact with a
mucous membrane. Wristbands should be programmed
to incorporate an alert mechanism to warn users when-
ever a potential movement of the hand towards the face
is detected. The accuracy achieved by relevant gesture
recognition work using inertial sensors [4,40] suggests
that the development of such alerting features is fea-
sible. These wearables can then be re-purposed once
the COVID-19 epidemic is over. For example they can
be given to older people and individuals with underling
heath conditions to monitor their health and well-being.
Also they can be used to keep vulnerable people con-
nected with local volunteers and community services.
6.2 Disease Transmission and the Use of Personal
Protective Equipment
As outlined by the WHO [38], COVID-19 is primar-
ily transmitted from person to person through small
droplets exhaled by the mouth or nose when an infected
individual speaks, sneezes or coughs. Direct transmis-
sion then occurs when such droplets travel onto the
mucous membranes of susceptible recipients, necessi-
tating contact at close range (usually within 1 meter)
[24]. In addition to this, exhaled droplets can also come
to rest on surfaces around the infected individual. Ac-
cording to the WHO, the COVID-19 virus can survive
up to 4 hours on copper, 24 hours on cardboard and
up to 72 hours on plastic and stainless steel surfaces.
As a consequence, these become a potential source of
infection when touched by susceptible individuals prior
to touching their nose, mouth or eyes. Although ex-
haled droplets are often heavy enough not to travel
great distances, sinking quickly to the ground or sur-
rounding surfaces, viral particles in the form of bio-
aerosols can remain airborne for an extended period
of time, particularly when droplet diameters are either
too small for gravitational deposition (<2 µm) or too
large for diffusive deposition (>200 µm) [51]. Experi-
mental results on SARS during the 2003 epidemic [11]
support these statements, showing viral particles in the
form of bio-aerosols were being emitted by hospitalised
patients. Likewise, recent work by [16] demonstrates
aerosol COVID-19 remains viable and infectious with
a half-life on the order of 1 hour, thus confirming the
plausibility of its transmission via airborne particles.
Given the above, the use of personal protective equip-
ment (PPE) can be a key aspect to prevent the trans-
mission of COVID-19. In this context, PPE includes,
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among other equipment, the use of respiratory protec-
tion to safeguard the mucous membranes and to prevent
the transmission of viral droplets such as masks and
respirators, as well as that of physical barriers such as
gloves, goggles and face shields.
6.2.1 The Use of Masks and Respirators
According to the European standards EN149:2001 and
EN14683, there are four types of filtering masks, namely
Filtering Face Piece 1 (FFP1), FFP2 1, FFP3 and sur-
gical masks, with different models differing primarily in
the filtration efficiency given by their capability to fil-
trate inwards and outwards particles. For the scope of
this work, the use of surgical and FFP2 masks is dis-
cussed. In terms of inwards filtration, surgical masks
are designed to protect against droplets, sprays and
any other particle with a diameter greater than 100µm
[50]. FFP2 masks, however, retain >94% of the parti-
cles smaller than 0.5µm. As the work in [8] indicated,
exhaled particles can range from 0.01 to 1000 µm, with
COVID-19 particles exhibiting a round or elliptic shape
with diameters ranging from 0.06 to 0.14 µm [13]. As a
consequence, surgical masks can prevent the inhalation
of COVID-19 particles when these are expelled in the
form of droplets with diameters greater than 100µm
but not when expelled in the form of small airborne
particles. In contrast, FFP2 masks or respirators pre-
vent the inhalation of both droplet and airborne viral
particles. Despite the drawbacks encountered on surgi-
cal masks when it comes to the prevention of the fil-
tration of small airborne particles, it must be noted
that they can reduce the emission of viral particles into
the environment [25]. It is worth noting that mask ef-
fectiveness decreases with increasing concentrations of
water vapour and carbon dioxide between the face and
the mask/respirator caused by each subsequent exhala-
tion [50]. Thus, masks should be replaced frequently. I
should also be noted face masks have to fitted correctly
and form a seal peripherally to stop air passing around
the mask and not through it.
It should also be stated, the incorrect use of PPE,
such as not changing disposable masks or gloves, can
have a counterproductive effect, thus jeopardising their
protective effect and even increasing the risk of infec-
tion [18]. Given this, health organisations and govern-
ment bodies should be spreading good clear information
covering how to wear and discard the different recom-
mended protective equipment components properly.
1 The American and Chinese equivalents for FFP2 are N95
and KN95 respectively
6.2.2 Other Personal Protective Equipment
As mentioned above, although COVID-19 is mainly trans-
mitted through direct contact between an infected and
a susceptible individual, indirect transmission is also
plausible. In addition to masks and respirators, the use
of further PPE can help to reduce the risk of the trans-
mission of COVID-19 both directly and indirectly. In
this context, face shields and eye protection equipment
such as goggles can play an important role in preventing
both direct and indirect transmission.
A face shield is a PPE component which provides a
physical protective barrier to the facial area and related
mucous membranes [43]. Various experimental works
[27,49] have shown the potential effectiveness of face
shields against the transmission of viral respiratory dis-
eases like COVID-19. For instance, the work in [27]
employed a cough aerosol simulator filled up with in-
fluenza virus (aerosol mean diameter of 8.5µm) along-
side a breathing simulator to test the effectiveness of
a face shield against the transmission of the virus. The
results reported outline risk reductions of 96% and 92%
on the inhalational exposure right after a cough at dis-
tances of 46cm and 183cm respectively. Reducing the
aerosol diameter to 3.4µm resulted in a reduction of
the blocking effectiveness to 68% at 46 cm right af-
ter a cough and to a 23% over a post-cough period of
1 to 30 minutes. The experimental work in [49] used
a fluorescent dye (particle diameter ≈ 5µm, distance
≈ 50cm) to evaluate the effectiveness of a face shield
at protecting eye contamination from aerosol particles.
The results outlined the use of a full face shield (FFS)
completely prevented eye contamination. Additionally,
it was demonstrated that the combination of the FFS
with a N95 respirator offered full protection of the eyes,
nose and mouth from contamination. In contrast, the
use of safety glasses with either a surgical mask or N95
respirator resulted in some eye contamination.
According to WHO recommendations [39], gloves
should be worn by medical personnel, laboratory tech-
nicians manipulating respiratory samples, caregivers who
provide direct care to confirmed COVID-19 patients
and visitors entering a COVID-19 patient’s room. There-
fore, the WHO does not consider the general use of dis-
posable gloves by the community necessary. Instead, a
thorough hand hygiene is proposed. Besides hand hy-
giene, a consistent disinfection of commonly touched
surfaces is recommended when an individual is quaran-
tined after contracting the disease to prevent its spread
to susceptible individuals who may co-handle those sur-
faces. In line with the WHO, it should not be recom-
mended that the general public use disposable gloves,
as this is unlikely to reduce the risk of infection and it
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may lead to a potential unnecessary shortage for sce-
narios in which they are indispensable and absolutely
necessary.
6.2.3 Final Recommendations on the Use of PPE
Provided the analysis upon the effectiveness of the dif-
ferent PPE components on the prevention of the spread
and on the contraction of COVID-19 carried out in
Sections 6.2.1 6.2.2, the following recommendations are
made:
1. Masks should be worn by every individual in the
population. Non-vulnerable individuals should use
surgical masks. FFP2 masks or respirators should be
worn by vulnerable individuals, especially in closed
environment public spaces such as supermarkets,
pharmacies and public transport.
2. Face shields are recommended for vulnerable indi-
viduals, especially in closed spaces. Ideally, face shields
should be worn in conjunction with an FFP2 mask
or respirator.
3. Gloves are not recommended for the general public.
6.3 Adoption and Incentive Mechanisms for
Behavioral Change
One of the challenges around implementing the pro-
posed solutions is getting people to adopt and use them.
In analogous settings, when young drivers were encour-
aged to use tracing technology solutions to improve
their driving habits; young drivers, who participated
in the technology trials, only used behaviour monitor-
ing apps while the incentives lasted and stopped when
the incentives stopped. Moreover, drivers often tried to
play and work the system in order to obtain extra incen-
tive points [33]. While the need to motivate individual
adoption is universal, a segmented reaction to the pro-
posed solutions and best practise is anticipated, so dif-
ferent strategies and incentive mechanisms might be re-
quired for different groups. Successful adoption depends
on individual motivation, incentives provided through
a variety of strategies. The incentive mechanisms can
range from providing information that is meant to res-
onate with basic values, such as using this technology
will save lives to material and non-material incentives
in the form of (i) paying people for their personal data
(e.g., providing tax-rebates, etc.) or (ii) providing prior-
ity access to some services (e.g., medical services, etc.).
For example, in the past, people successfully adopted
healthy behaviours when they received financial incen-
tives [30]. From this, it follows that if incentives are
offered people (a) adopt a certain behavior or (b) en-
gage in a behavioral change. Rightly or wrongly these
incentives may be more effective if they appeal to peo-
ple’s ”present bias”, which is the tendency to pursue
smaller and more immediate rewards (e.g. getting a
small amount of money every day) rather than bigger
and more abstract goals, such ”eradicating COVID-19
in the world”. One potential incentivization mechanism
could be offering a better value proposition to the user
that goes beyond tracing. Considering that the vulner-
able population generally tend to procure care services
more often [48], the function of contact tracing is likely
to succeed if it is embedded into the general care appli-
cations and services. An example of such general care
services would be framing the contact tracing technol-
ogy as a digital nurse for the vulnerable groups, that
aims to monitor (in real time) the state of the wearer
and potentially offer some desirable care features. Fea-
tures such as health monitoring or being able to make
automated calls for medical help in case the wearable
detects signs of distress, etc. [55]. Having a clear value
proposition, which would go beyond the functional pur-
pose of tracing would allow the technological solutions
to succeed with the elderly population [45] more easily,
as users will see not only how their data can benefit
society, but also how their data can help them receive
better, more efficient, and higher quality care. In such
situations, due to the behavioural ”privacy paradox”
[34], users, who are concerned about privacy, are also
likely to perceive the added value of the technological
solutions as a trade-off between their personal data and
desirable services. If the benefits of using the technol-
ogy outweighs the cost (in terms of personal data loss),
users will be much more likely to adopt the new wear-
ables, even if that requires disclosing their location [64].
This, in turn, will significantly increase the chances of
technology adoption as well as ensure policy success.
Considering that people tend to attribute greater value
and use products that have a cost associated with them
(e.g., people see greater value in goods and services they
need to pay for rather than free goods and services),
such value proposition (i.e., offering medical or care
service benefits in exchange for personal data) is likely
to be self-sustainable. An alternative incentive mecha-
nism can be implemented through material incentives
by offering to buy personal data from the users (i.e.,
the users will receive financial remuneration for their
personal data) [46]. This mechanism will leverage on
participants’ willingness to trade privacy in the context
of willingness to accept (WTA) money in exchange for
data. The mechanism could work through offering a cer-
tain amount of money or an equivalent in discounts for
users’ personal data in a clear and transparent trans-
A Modified Epidemiological Model to Understand the Impact of COVID-19 on Vulnerable Individuals 13
Fig. 12: Adoption Approaches
action [9]. The key to success in this case is full trans-
parency about (i) who is the data buyer (government or
third-party organizations); (ii) how the data buyer will
use the data; and (iii) how the data buyer will protect
user data. The third strategy to push for adherence
to the use of the proposed solutions, is through legal
means. For example, contact tracing could be mandated
by law and distributed to the eligible population. The
use of the technology can then be monitored and ”fines”
for non-compliance could be introduced. The ”fines” do
not necessarily have to be monetary. They can be imple-
mented as decreased benefits. The success of such this
approach greatly depends on cultural values and social
norms (in some societies punishment may work better
than reward in policy implementations) [31]. The three
suggested approaches are summarized on Figure 12.
6.4 Lockdown Easing Plan
Once past the peak of the epidemic, that is, the expo-
nential phase of the curve, it is then time to develop
plans for a gradual easing of the imposed restrictions.
Several research works [22,7,20], including the work
presented here, have proposed a variety of epidemio-
logical models to study the spread of the disease and to
make the consequent estimations of the total number
COVID-19 cases in different territories. Having done
that, it is possible to have estimations on the herd im-
munity gained throughout the progression of the dis-
ease. However, there are still many unknowns of the dis-
ease which may potentially compromise the estimations
made by the application of such epidemiological mod-
els. Given this, government bodies should be pressed to
carry out prevalence studies to further support the esti-
mations obtained by the use of epidemiological models,
as it is crucial for the minimisation of further infection
cases and consequently for the reduction of the num-
ber of further deaths caused by the disease, to have
accurate numbers for the number of people who have
already had and recovered from the disease and have,
thus produced antibodies against it.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
The key driver for this work has been the large size of
the vulnerable population and their higher risk of severe
infection and death. This group is also prone to suffer
from loneliness resulting from the prolonged period of
lockdown. Governments need to balance the need to
socially isolate vulnerable people and shield them while
also taking into account their mental health and well-
being which might be severely affected by the isolation
measures.
A modified SEIR model, namely SEIR-v, through
which the population was separated into two groups re-
garding their vulnerability to the disease was proposed
to provide a means of studying the spread and the case
fatality rate of COVID-19 when different contention
measures are applied to different groups regarding that
vulnerability. Using SEIR-v the impact of a reduction
in the exposure of vulnerable individuals to COVID-
19 on the number of fatalities caused by the disease
was analysed. The results indicate an average of 2675
deaths can still be saved by only reducing by 10% the
exposure of vulnerable groups to the disease from now.
In line with this and also considering the negative con-
sequences caused by the application of strict isolation
measures on people’s mental health, a set of recom-
mendations including the adoption of digital tools and
protective equipment was proposed. Future work will
be directed towards the analysis of the lockdown easing
steps taken by the U.K. government and their potential
impact on further fatalities caused by COVID-19.
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